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ABSTRACT: This article discusses the conflicting use of nonstate
actors in state-sponsored actions. It also introduces a diplomatic
strategy for regulating the application of violence by private military
and security companies.

O

n the night of February 7–8, 2018, for the first time since the
Vietnam War, American and Russian forces clashed directly.1 A
Russian-Syrian force of approximately 500 fighters crossed the
Euphrates River near the eastern Syrian city of Deir ez-Zzor and launched
an attack. The target, on the other side of the river, was a base for the
Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces and its US military advisors. During
the three-hour battle that followed, the US military deployed artillery,
jets, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles. In the subsequent press
conference, Lieutenant General Jeffrey L. Harrigian, the commander of
US Air Forces Central Command, reported these US forces “release[d]
multiple precision fire munitions and conduct[ed] strafing runs against
the advancing aggressor force, stopping their advance and destroying
multiple artillery pieces and tanks.” 2 While US forces incurred no
casualties, some reports suggest as many as 100–200 Russians were killed
in the engagement.3
Adding to the significance and complexity of this event, the Russian
forces were not soldiers in state uniforms. Instead, they were personnel
of Wagner, a Russian private military and security company (PMSC). In
recent years, 2,500 Wagner personnel have operated in Syria as Russia’s
unofficial “boots on the ground.” 4 Reports of the company using a
military base in southern Russia and relying upon state-sponsored
military logistics and medical services tie the company to Russian state
actors.5 Nevertheless, officials responding to the February battle could
simply distance themselves: “Russian service members did not take
part in any capacity and Russian military equipment was not used.” 6
Elements in the nation’s media drew a further distinction: “It was a
1      Joshua Yaffa, “Putin’s Shadow Army Suffers a Setback in Syria,” New Yorker, February 16, 2018.
2      “News Transcript: Department of Defense Press Briefing by Lieutenant General Harrigian
via Teleconference from Al Udeid Airbase, Qatar,” US Department of Defense (DoD), February
13, 2018.
3      Yaffa, “Putin’s Shadow Army”; and David Isenberg, “Putin’s Pocket Army? The Rise of
Russian Mercenaries in Syria,” American Conservative, February 15, 2018.
4      John Sparks, “Revealed: Russia’s ‘Secret Syria Mercenaries,’ ” Sky News, August 10, 2016.
5      William Watkinson, “Russian Mercenaries Reportedly Hired To Fight Isis in Syria despite
Kremlin’s Denials,” International Business Times, August 10, 2016; Maria Tsvetkova and Anton Zverev,
“Ghost Soldiers: The Russians Secretly Dying for the Kremlin in Syria,” Reuters, November 3, 2016;
and Henry Meyer and Stepan Kravchenko, “Mercenaries Hurt in U.S. Syria Strikes Are Treated at
Russian Defense Hospitals,” Bloomberg, February 14, 2018.
6      Ellen Nakashima, Karen DeYoung, and Liz Sly, “Putin Ally Said To Be in Touch with Kremlin,
Assad before His Mercenaries Attacked U.S. Troops,” Washington Post, February 22, 2018.
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purely commercial issue. It had nothing to do with war.” 7 These Russian
denials came easily even though this was the single largest loss of PMSC
personnel lives since the rise of the phenomenon in the 1990s.8
Despite the significance of this confrontation, the official US
reaction was muted too. When reporters pressed for the composition
of the group US forces had confronted, Defense Secretary James Mattis
pleaded ignorance: “I think the Russians would’ve told us. If they—as
long as they knew, you know, then they probably would’ve told us. Right
now I don’t want to say what they were or were not, because I don’t have
that kind of information.” 9 Harrigian’s response to a similar query was
both comparable and diversionary: “I’m going to be clear that I will not
speculate on the composition of this force or whose control they were
under . . . we are focused on a singular enemy: ISIS.” 10 Additionally,
a telephone conversation between US President Donald Trump and
Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 12, 2018, did not cover
the clash. Notwithstanding this obfuscation, PMSCs, which were a
fixture in the US-led interventions earlier in this century, have now
entered the realm of great-power confrontation.
In light of this significance, this article answers the following
questions: What role do PMSCs play in Russian military endeavors?
What informs this role? And what policy might inform a US response in
the longer term? In answering these questions, the article identifies the
presence of PMSCs in Russian military thinking. In turn, it highlights the
recent Russian utilization of PMSCs as a gray-zone challenge, defined as
“competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between
the traditional war and peace duality [that] are characterized by ambiguity
about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, or
uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks.” 11
Given this challenge, the article contends the United States might
robustly highlight its stance towards the PMSC industry: namely,
America should place PMSCs in a normatively defensive context in
which utilization is transparent.12 The United States might promote
greater international acceptance of the Montreux Document, which
US officials have endorsed, that sets the defensive nature of PMSCs.
Since the document establishes that PMSCs focus on “armed guarding
and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places;
maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and
advice to or training of local forces and security personnel,” successfully
promoting it might help the United States influence the removal of such
nonstate actors from Russia’s gray-zone arsenal.13

  7      Yaffa, “Putin’s Shadow Army.”
  8      Isenberg, “Putin’s Pocket Army.”
  9      “News Transcript: Media Availability with Secretary Mattis,” DoD, February 8, 2018.
10      “Briefing by Lieutenant General Harrigian,” DoD, February 13, 2018.
11      Philip Kapusta, “The Gray Zone,” Special Warfare 28, no. 4 (October–December 2015): 20
(emphasis in original).
12      For this article, a norm is “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given
identity.” Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change,” International Organization 52, 4 (Autumn 1998): 891.
13      International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Montreux Document: On Pertinent International
Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies
during Armed Conflict (Geneva: ICRC, 2009), 9 (emphasis added).
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Russian Thinking and Usage

Using contractors, and PMSCs as a subset of those actors, is a key
element of the American way of war.14 This application was made plain
during the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq—for instance,
US Central Command reported 176,000 contractors were deployed
alongside the 209,000 uniformed personnel under its responsibility in
2010.15 The PMSC employees accounted for about 15 percent of the
private presence, an amount considerably larger than many military
contingents offered by America’s allies.16
For the United States, this development is, in part, a function of
decades of decisions underscored by both the strategic requirement for
resources and neoliberal thinking.17 The integration concerns how, why,
and by whom tasks are done, with an eye towards reaping the benefits
of fostering a division between service managers and service providers
with the latter facing potential competitors. The desired result is to
reduce costs, gain efficiencies, and create economies of scale.
Looking back to the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration initiated
public-private competitions. A decade later, the Johnson administration
reinforced this approach through the Performance of Commercial Activities
circular. The Reagan, Clinton, and W. Bush administrations bolstered
the process and its dual fundamentals of preventing government
competition with civilian enterprise and maintaining competitive
responses and economic efficiency.18 Analysis of the resulting changes
reveals a movement from government towards governance.19
Given the fact that the United States is both the world’s dominant
military power and largest consumer of PMSC services, other states have
taken note for the sake of assessment and adaptation if not emulation.
For-profit actors, for instance, are now nestled into contemporary
Russian considerations of the nature of war. Russian military doctrine
released in 2014 specifically categorizes such nonstate actors as private

14      Deborah D. Avant and Renée de Nevers, “Military Contractors & the American Way of War,”
Daedalus 140, 3 (Summer 2011): 88–99; and Sean McFate, “America’s Addiction to Mercenaries,”
Atlantic, August 12, 2016.
15      Moshe Schwartz and Joyprada Swain, Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq:
Background and Analysis (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service [CRS], 2011), 5.
16      McFate, “America’s Addiction.”
17      Mark Erbel, “The Underlying Causes of Military Outsourcing in the USA and UK: Bridging
the Persistent Gap between Ends, Ways and Means since the Beginning of the Cold War,” Defence
Studies 17, no. 2 (June 2017): 135–55. The prevalence of private actors in recent interventions
reflects overly conservative calculations about force requirements. Scott L. Efflandt, “Military
Professionalism & Private Military Contractors,” Parameters 44, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 54.
18      Performance of Commercial Activities, Circular A-76 (Washington, DC: Office of Management
and Budget, 1999); Ann R. Markusen, “The Case Against Privatizing National Security,” Governance
16, no. 4 (October 2003): 480; and Jennifer K. Elsea, Moshe Schwartz, and Kennon H. Nakamura,
Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues, RL32419 (Washington, DC:
CRS, August 25, 2008).
19      On the challenges of transitioning from government to governance, see Elke Krahmann,
“Security Governance and the Private Military Industry in Europe and North America,” Conflict,
Security & Development 5, no. 2 (August 2005): 247–68.
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military companies.20 Likewise, General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the
General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, has reflected on the changes
in the conduct of warfare. While widely recognized as the Gerasimov
doctrine, “doctrine” likely goes too far in terms of offering a sense of
programmatic unity.21 Nevertheless, for the purposes of this article,
private military companies are presented therein as a new actor in the
modern milieu.22
While Gerasimov and his colleagues may have merely acknowledged
the American way of war or, relatedly, identified the means and challenges
Russia will likely confront in the future, one can rightly argue that
they do, in fact, describe Russian approaches and practices, especially
regarding for-profit violent actors.23 In the collective Russian approach
towards these actors, the word “military” is quite flexible. From one
angle, private military companies are deemed nonmilitary armed forces.
This reflects the variance of manpower levels, weaponry types, and
professionalism—or capability and firepower—compared to a state’s
army, navy, and air force.24 From another angle, these actors are not solely
for maintaining the status quo or for offering protective services. Instead,
“private military companies . . . prepare an operational setup” for the
eventual activities of state armed forces.25 These actors can also conduct
independent offensive operations. Moreover, the relationship between
state authorities and private military companies is quite intimate, to the
point that companies form “ ‘hybrid businesses,’ technically private, but
essentially acting as an arm of the Russian state.” 26
The characteristics and nature of this approach are informed by two
factors. First, private military companies fit into “new generation warfare,” which despite some differences is known in Western assessments
as hybrid warfare.27 In this approach, armed forces remain valuable;
however, the state utilization and orchestration of nonmilitary measures
of strategic influence are increasingly important.28 On one hand, “new”
20      Fredrik Westerlund and Johan Norberg, “Military Means for Non-Military Measures: The
Russian Approach to the Use of Armed Force as Seen in Ukraine,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29,
no. 4 (2016): 581. “Private military company” is consistent with the Russian representation. “Private
military and security company” covers various terms used to refer to private military contractors,
private security companies, private security contractors, military service providers, and military
provider firms. “All studies and accounts of PMSCs begin with the problem of simple definition:
they are ambiguous or polymorphous entities.” Kateri Carmola, Private Security Contractors and New
Wars: Risk, Law, and Ethics (New York: Routledge, 2010), 9.
21      Keir Giles, Russia’s “New” Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s
Exercise of Power (London: Chatham House, 2016), 10; Samuel Charap, “The Ghost of Hybrid War,”
Survival 57, no. 6 (December 2015–January 2016): 53; Andrew Monaghan, “The ‘War’ in Russia’s
‘Hybrid Warfare,’ ” Parameters 45, no. 4 (Winter 2015–16): 65–74; and Mark Galeotti, “I’m Sorry for
Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine,’ ” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2018.
22      Westerlund and Norberg, “Military Means,” 580.
23      Charap, “Ghost of Hybrid War,” 53; and Timothy Thomas, “The Evolution of Russian
Military Thought: Integrating Hybrid, New-Generation, and New-Type Thinking,” Journal of Slavic
Military Studies 29, no. 4 (2016): 555.
24      Westerlund and Norberg, “Military Means,” 588. Special Forces, though in uniformed state
service, are nevertheless also categorized as nonmilitary armed forces in the Russian approach.
25      Dimitry (Dima) Adamsky, Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy,
Proliferation Papers 54 (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 2015), 24; and Janis
Berzins, Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy, Policy Paper 2
(Riga: National Defence Academy of Latvia, 2014), 13.
26      Mark Galeotti, “Moscow’s Mercenaries in Syria,” War on the Rocks, April 5, 2016.
27      Adamsky, Cross-Domain Coercion, 9, 21; Thomas, “Evolution of Russian Military Thought,”
554; and Berzins, Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine.
28      Adamsky, Cross-Domain Coercion, 9.
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may be somewhat of a misnomer. The Soviet experience reveals a long
history of relying upon nonstate actors, whether partisans or guerrillas, in
various countries, to achieve directed military and policy objectives.29 In
this sense, contemporary Russia has not turned to military and security
privatization to reduce costs, gain efficiency, and create economies of
scale as is evident in the US case. Instead, with nonstate actors working
in conjunction with the Russian state, Moscow is revisiting the use of
nonstate uniformed means. On the other hand, Gerasimov asserts the
“role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals
has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons
in their effectiveness.” 30 In this “new” environment, actors like PMSCs are
perceived to have a leg up, at least in some domains, vis-à-vis much
larger state-based organizations.
The second factor is that the uncertain legal status of these nonstate
actors in the Russian context heightens the obfuscation.31 To explain,
there are currently no rules in the Russian Criminal Code that define
the use of Russian firms abroad. Companies so operating have had to
present themselves as advisors or “training centers” or have sought
incorporation outside of Russian territory.32 This solution applied, for
instance, to Russian firms conducting tasks such as defending maritime
shipping from pirates, escorting logistics convoys in conflict zones, and
protecting energy sector infrastructure. This approach is required to
take a wide berth around Article 359 of the Russian Criminal Code that
prohibits Russian mercenaries. In this context, a mercenary is “a person
who acts for the purpose of getting a material reward, and who is not a
citizen of the state in whose armed conflict or hostilities he participates,
who does not reside on a permanent basis on its territory and who is not
a person fulfilling official duties.” 33
The RSB-Group, for example, is registered domestically to work
within Russia and registered in the British Virgin Islands for international
operations.34 In 2016–17, the RSB-Group employees worked in eastern
Libya ostensibly to remove landmines. Owner Oleg Krinitsyn indicated,
however, the firm had other tasks and operated under liberal conditions
regarding the application of violence: “If we’re under assault we enter
29      Notably, degrees of effort also varied during the Cold War with “the Soviet Union maintain[ing] more military advisors in Latin America and Africa than the US had globally.” Graham H.
Turbiville Jr., Logistic Support and Insurgency: Guerrilla Sustainment and Applied Lessons of Soviet Insurgent
Warfare: Why It Should Still Be Studied, JSOU Report 05-4 (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations
University, 2005), 12.
30      Robert Coalson, “Top Russian General Lays Bare Putin’s Plan for Ukraine,” Huffington Post,
September 2, 2014 (italics added).
31      Unlike Russia, the United States recognizes PMSCs as entities subject to US legal measures.
The Defense Department, the State Department, and the US Agency for International Development
established the framework for referring possible violations of the Military Extraterritorial Judicial
Act by PMSC personnel to the Justice Department. See National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 122 Stat. 3 (2008).
32      “Iraq, Private Russian Security Guards Instead of the Foreign Armies,” Asia News, October
28, 2009; and Olivia Allison, “Informal but Diverse: The Market for Exported Force from Russia
and Ukraine,” in The Markets for Force: Privatization of Security across World Regions, ed. Molly Dunigan
and Ulrich Petersohn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 95.
33      Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Fed. L. 64-FZ (1996), pt. 2, sec. 7, ch. 34, art.
359, para. 3; and Signe Zaharova, “Russian Federation: Regulatory Tools regarding Private Entities
Performing Military and Security Services,” in Multilevel Regulation of Military and Security Contractors:
The Interplay between International, European and Domestic Norms, ed. Christine Bakker and Mirko Sossai
(Oxford: Hart, 2012), 475.
34      Pavel Felgenhauer, “Private Military Companies Forming Vanguard of Russian Foreign
Operations,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 14, no. 36 (March 16, 2017).
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the battle, of course, to protect our lives and the lives of our clients. . . .
According to military science, a counterattack must follow an attack.
That means we would have to destroy the enemy.” 35 Moreover, the
group operated in a region controlled by General Khalifa Haftar, a
warlord enjoying both Egyptian and Russian support. Though the firm’s
actual employer is unknown, Krinitsyn did indicate the RSB-Group
was “ ‘consulting’ with the Russian foreign ministry.” 36 In short, the
RSB-Group provided Russia the ability to maintain its influence without
a uniformed state presence.
The malleability of the Russian approach is also evident in the case of
the Moran Security Group and the Slavonic Corps. In 2013, supposedly
Syrian paymasters hired the Moran Security Group to protect energy
infrastructure. Moran gave this task to the Slavonic Corps (registered in
Hong Kong), which provided 267 personnel for the proposed five-month
mission.37 The mission subsequently changed to offensive operations
with activities directed against Syrian rebels. Poorly resourced, the
service ended after only one month. Detaining the security personnel
who returned to Russia in the fall of 2013, the Federal Security Services
(FSB) also conducted the first arrests under Article 359—Vadim Gusev
and Evgeny Sidorov, two Slavonic Corps commanders. This response
occurred despite the fact that the head of Moran Security Group was a
FSB reservist and the mission likely had FSB clearance.38
Finally, Russian firms can be absorbed into broader state initiatives
designed to create hesitation and confusion consistent with gray-zone
challenges. For instance, Russian orchestration of the conflict in Crimea
and eastern Ukraine featured a variety of armed actors known as “green
men” that brought about Russia’s creeping success. Russian firms such
as Wagner were part of this collage, and media reports suggest Wagner
had access to a Russian military base near eastern Ukraine.39 Reports
also suggest the company’s efforts were highly valued by other actors on
the ground.40 Indeed, the US government recognized Wagner’s impact
in the region after the fact: the company “recruited and sent soldiers
to fight alongside separatists in eastern Ukraine. PMC Wagner is being
designated for being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged
in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace,
security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine.” 41

35      Maria Tsvetkova, “Exclusive: Russian Private Security Firm Says It Had Armed Men in East
Libya,” Reuters, March 10, 2017.
36      Tsvetkova, “Russian Private Security.”
37      James Miller, “The Insane Story of Russian Mercenaries Fighting for the Syrian Regime,”
Huffington Post, November 21, 2013; James Miller, “Putin’s Attack Helicopters and Mercenaries Are
Winning the War for Assad,” Foreign Policy, March 30, 2016; and Michael Weiss, “The Case of the
Keystone Cossacks,” Foreign Policy, November 21, 2013.
38      Weiss, “Keystone Cossacks”; Miller, “Russian Mercenaries”; and Gregory Wilson, “PROXY
Capabilities: The History and Future of Russian Private Military Companies,” Isenberg Institute of
Strategic Satire, April 5, 2016.
39      Laurence Peter, “Syria War: Who Are Russia’s Shadowy Wagner Mercenaries?,” BBC News,
February 23, 2018.
40      “The Ride of the Mercenaries: How ‘Wagner’ Came to Syria,” Economist, November 2, 2017.
41      “Treasury Designates Individuals and Entities Involved in the Ongoing Conflict in Ukraine,”
US Department of the Treasury, June 20, 2017.
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Toward a Diplomatic Strategy

The United States has had many reasons to set limits on the PMSC
industry. Certainly, America wished to avoid accusations of hiring
mercenaries, who are inherently shadowy actors in the modern context.
The pejorative term, mercenary, would have tainted US initiatives in
already complex undertakings such as the interventions in Afghanistan
and Iraq. The United States Federal Acquisition Regulation plainly
establishes PMSC personnel are “not mercenaries and are not authorized
to engage in offensive operations.” 42 Though the international legal
definition of a mercenary does not make an offensive or defensive
differentiation, nor does Article 359 of the Russian Criminal Code, the
United States, through its purchasing power and regulatory activities,
has instilled this distinction.43
Moreover, making this distinction permitted the US military to
focus actively upon offensive undertakings that upset the status quo,
showed initiative in theatre, seized territory (rather than only holding
it), and demanded specialized skillsets and sophisticated equipment
denied to other actors.44 In the official US determination then, PMSCs
are defensively boxed: “The use of force by [PMSCs] is limited to selfdefense, the defense of others and the protection of U.S. Government
property. . . . [PMSCs] may not engage in combat, which is defined
as deliberate destructive action against hostile armed forces or other
armed actors.” 45
Making this distinction was also valuable because other states, as
indicated above, followed the US lead vis-à-vis military and security
privatization. Since the PMSC activities of others could negatively
impact US operations in theatre, framing the PMSC industry through
common practices, expectations, and regulation became important.46
Thus the United States was a key negotiating party and one of the
original state signatories to the Montreux Document, which at the time
of writing, had been endorsed by 54 states, 24 of which are NATO
members and many of whom are close US allies; Russia is not a signatory.
Linked to this evolution, the American National Standards
Institute and ASIS International developed the PSC.1 Standard in
2012, at the request of the US Department of Defense.47 This standard
operationalizes the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service
Providers, the industry’s supporting initiative for the Montreux Document. 48
42      Hearing on Department of Defense Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, 110th Cong 13 (April 2, 2008) (statement of Mr. P. Jackson Bell, Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness), 13.
43      ICRC, Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: ICRC, 2010),
article 47.
44      Christopher Spearin, Private Military and Security Companies and States: Force Divided (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 23–50, 89–116.
45      “Private Security Companies,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics &
Materiel Readiness, accessed May 2, 2018.
46      Deborah D. Avant, “Pragmatic Networks and Transnational Governance of Private Military
and Security Services,” International Studies Quarterly 60, 2 (June 2016): 338.
47      ASIS International (ASIS), Management System for Quality of Private Security Company Operations—
Requirements with Guidance, ANSI/ASIS PSC.1-2012 (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International, 2012).
48      ICRC, International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (Geneva: ICRC, 2010);
and Whitney Grespin, The Evolving Contingency Contracting Market: Private Sector Self-Regulation and United
States Government Monitoring of Procurement of Stability Operations Services (Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping and
Stability Operations Institute, 2016), 24.
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As stressed by Ian Ralby, PSC.1 “provides auditable procedures for the
development, certification, and monitoring of ongoing compliance” of
PMSCs at home and abroad.49 The US Departments of Defense and
State now require PSC.1 compliance for the firms they hire, and other
state and private clients of PMSCs have embraced the standard.50
Given the particular nature of Russia’s reliance upon military and
security privatization, the United States faces a challenge with two
characteristics. First, Russia’s offensive use of these nonstate actors
conflicts with the longstanding US practice and political efforts toward
limiting PMSCs to defensive endeavors. Second, Russia utilizes, rather
than employs, these actors. This challenge is exacerbated further by the
relationship between the two nations: Russia is not an ally with whom
the United States might engage closely or diplomatically nor are the
countries likely to develop a common practice in theatre.
Nevertheless, the United States might make progress by drawing
attention to how Russia relies upon military and security privatization.
As Deborah Avant notes, one cannot ignore the impact of the United
States, which “has chosen to play a large consumer role in this market and
its choices have therefore had a large impact on the market’s ecology.” 51
This role has helped to limit what the international industry should sell
and to indicate, in a normative sense, what other interested parties should
buy. This “defensive” norm does not collapse simply because Russia does
not fully follow it in the first or early instances. However, given that
norms are influenced strongly through practice, especially the practice of
powerful actors, they could loosen. This weakening standard would have
negative implications for maintaining international peace and security
and managing violence worldwide. In short, a strong US influence can
preserve the country’s normative power to maintain global stability.
In this vein, the US government recently upheld its defensive
credentials by turning down the possibility of employing PMSCs more
robustly and offensively. On several occasions in 2017, Erik Prince, the
founder of the PMSC Blackwater, advocated for the United States to
take a new approach towards its operations in Afghanistan. His plan,
directed more towards counterterrorism than counterinsurgency,
called for reducing the US military presence. Prince proposed 5,000
contractors and 90 privately supplied aircraft to replace departing US
military elements.52 Rather than rotating in and out as state military
forces do, this private presence would be a long-term engagement at
a substantially lower annual cost of $10 billion rather than the $45
billion spent currently. Under this plan, these private personnel would
both mentor and become enmeshed within the Afghan security sector.
Personnel would become more and more engaged in the full spectrum
of operations, moving beyond the limitations set for the international
PMSC industry. Nevertheless, despite President Trump’s avowed
tendency toward unorthodox solutions, the proposal was not acted upon.
49      Grespin, Evolving Contingency Contracting Market, 24.
50      Avant, “Pragmatic Networks,” 339.
51      Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 220.
52      Erik D. Prince, “The MacArthur Model for Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal, May 31 2017;
Erik Prince, “Erik Prince: Contractors, Not Troops, Will Save Afghanistan,” New York Times, August
30 2017; and William Gallo, Ayub Khawreen, and Hasib Danish Alikozai, “Plan to Privatize US War
in Afghanistan Gets Icy Reception,” Voice of America, August 12, 2017.
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The second reason to preserve this normative power relates to the
strategic implications for the United States. As Russia has made clear,
companies can be used in gray-zone conflict activities that feature “rising
revisionist intent, a form of strategic gradualism, and unconventional
tools.” 53 Gray-zone practitioners look to upend the international system
favoring the United States slowly through efforts that fall short of major
armed conflict or that occur in bewildering ways. For Russia, its use of
firms deviates from US expectations, promotes deniability, and increases
confusion in regions of US interest.
Given the difficulty in deterring Russia from utilizing a particular
tool in its gray-zone arsenal, either through the threat of force or
sanction, US promotion of the Montreux Document might help steer
privatization efforts away from the aforementioned ambiguity, opacity,
and uncertainty inherent in wider gray-zone endeavors. Formal, statesanctioned efforts will bring the utility of unconventional gray-zone
strategies into doubt.54 To avoid the castigation caused by having its
efforts labeled mercenary and obscure, Russia might eventually sign the
document or at least adopt a similar approach.
Several factors underscore this contention. To start with, the
Montreux Document has a catholic approach to “private business entities
that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they
describe themselves.” 55 The document can, therefore, apply to a variety of
activities. In turn, by identifying and relying upon existing international
law, the document spells out the pertinent legal obligations for states.
Fulfilling these requirements makes it less likely that states can deny a
PMSC presence and argues against the notion that the organizations exist
in legal limbo. To ensure further transparency, the document outlines
good practices for states to follow. Thus, promoting the internationally
recognized Montreux Document rather than advancing the US standard
PSC.1, which might be problematic for universal acceptance, would
make diplomatic sense.
Furthermore, the management and control of violence concerns all
states. One can view this from two angles. First, as Jack Straw asserted
when he was the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs, “The control of violence is one of the
fundamental issues—perhaps the fundamental issue—in politics.” 56
Managing and framing the limitations on nonstate actors capable of
applying violence has been a long-term effort, arguably ongoing since
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It is a task engaged by states for the
sake of preserving the state as an institution and for creating joint

53      Michael J. Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2015), 4.
54      On June 20, 2017, the US Treasury Department implemented sanctions against a handful of
Russian actors and entities, including Dmitry Utkin, Wagner’s founder. This action coincided with
President Trump’s meeting with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in the White House. Note,
however, that these sanctions did not halt Russia’s usage of Wagner in Syria. Stepan Kravchenko and
Jake Rudnitsky, “U.S. Expands Russia Sanctions as Trump Meets Ukrainian Head,” Bloomberg, June
10, 2017; and Shaun Walker and Julian Border, “US Broadens Russia Sanctions as Ukraine President
Visits Trump,” Guardian (Manchester), June 20, 2017.
55      ICRC, Montreux Document, 9.
56      United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Private Military Companies: Options for
Regulation 2001–02, HC 577 (London: The Stationery Office, 2002), 4.
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expectations within the international society of states.57 Second, in a
more immediate way, while the Russian use of these nonstate actors is
cast in the context of upending the international system favoring the
United States, gray-zone conflict dynamics and revisionist intents might
appeal to other states who wish to shift at least a local dyadic or regional
status quo. Consequently, these objectives arguably behoove many
states to prevent erstwhile adversaries from asymmetrically levelling
the playing field through military and security privatization. Taken
together, the United States need not focus solely on Russia given the
wider international utility.
Additionally, there are specific Russian matters to consider.
Although it did not sign the Montreux Document, a Russian delegation
was involved early in the negotiations. Most likely, Western criticism of
Russia’s August 2008 conflict with Georgia subdued Moscow’s interest
in the initiative.58 In this vein, though they have not come to fruition,
there have been several domestic legislative attempts to authorize and
legalize the foreign work of Russian firms.59 Finally, there have been
concerns within the Russian security sector that substantial military and
security privatization efforts will affect morale and give rise to unhealthy
competition.60 Taken together, these factors speak to a larger constituency
for having Russia become part of the international normative fold.

Concluding Remarks

Russia’s use of firms as offensive tools in gray-zone conflict is not in
keeping with the defensive use of PMSCs established by global practices
underscored by the United States. Indeed, the United States sets such
standards in large part by its own usage of PMSCs, by serving as an
example for others, and by its diplomatic engagement, often with close
allies. Russia’s application of these nonstate actors is also contrary to
the associated effort to make the industry more transparent and less
deniable. As such, a renewed emphasis on spreading the merits of the
Montreux Document would be an appropriate US policy response. Such
an effort is important because, as is plain with the Russian experience,
the PMSC phenomenon should no longer be interpreted as a creature
of policymaking within the United States and between it and its allies.
Many PMSCs are now a part of the confrontational, if not adversarial,
relationships between great powers.
Given these stakes, this article recommends two avenues for further
examination. The first is for the United States to engage the PMSC
industry to sustain and to elevate the Montreux Document. Earlier actions
57      Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence
in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 7–20.
58      James Cockayne, “Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content,
Negotiation, Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux Document,” Journal of Conflict & Security
Law 13, 3 (2009): 425.
59      “RBC Publishes Report Sourced in FSB and Military on Wagner Private Military Contractor
with 2,500 Fighters in Syria,” Interpreter, August 26, 2016; Wilson, “PROXY Capabilities”; Pierre
Vaux, “Fontanka Investigates Russian Mercenaries Dying for Putin in Syria and Ukraine,” Interpreter,
March 29, 2016; “Bill To Allow Private Military Contractors Submitted to Russian Parliament,” RT,
October 22, 2014; and Alexey Eremenko, “Blackwater.ru: The Future of Russian Private Military
Companies,” Moscow Times, November 12, 2014.
60      As an example, officials raised these concerns in the context of the Russian government
decision allowing firms like Gazprom to develop their own security forces. See also “Ride of the
Mercenaries,” Economist.
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and statements of individual companies and industry associations
suggest they too wish to avoid the normatively pejorative label of
mercenary.61 To capture this statistically, over 700 companies have
signed the aforementioned International Code of Conduct for Private
Security Service Providers. Consideration might be given, therefore, to
catalyzing and supporting industry activism that might ensure PMSCs
do not become tarnished by the “offensiveness” of Russian activities.
The second avenue concerns engaging close US allies—in particular,
relying upon NATO as a platform through which to advance the Montreux
Document. On one hand, United States-NATO relations are rocky at the
time of writing. On the other hand, European NATO members are now
paying more attention towards continental defense, not because of US
badgering but because they recognize the challenge posed on their eastern
flank.62 Forming part of this challenge is Russia’s usage of companies,
which is part of Moscow’s gray-zone arsenal. Given that NATO has
worked to counter other elements in this arsenal through efforts such as
its Centres of Excellence for Strategic Communications, for Cooperative
Cyber Defence, and for Countering Hybrid Threats, promoting the
Montreux Document would fit well into this repertoire. Moreover, NATO
has already highlighted its acceptance of the document in the context
of human security furtherance through the binding and regulation of
the PMSC industry.63 Thus, one more step would be to put the PMSC
issue into the frame of European defense. This would permit European
NATO members to address matters better in their own neighborhood
and to highlight to states in other regions the challenges presented by
similar offensive and difficult to counter activities.

61      Spearin, Private Military, 101.
62      Lucie Beraud-Sudreau and Bastian Giegerich, “NATO Defence Spending and European
Threat Perceptions,” Survival 60, 4 (August–September 2018): 53–54.
63      “NATO Partners–Building on Two Decades of Success,” NATO, May 28, 2014.

